

POST-ELECTORAL SCENARIO

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Let me provide two considerations related with the composition of the Parliament and the investiture:

- If all citizens' vote had the same value, Junts pel Si would have obtained 56 representatives, 6 less than now. CUP would have obtained one more, but between both options they would have summed 67 seats, which means that an eventual absolute majority for independence would not have been possible (68 seats). PP would have obtained one more seat and PSC and CSQP two more each. The current configuration of the Chamber derives from the manipulation of the preferences expressed by citizens. This should be taken into account, as an appeal for caution, especially regarding a topic such as independence.

- With 62 seats, Junts pel Si will have to negotiate votes for and/or abstentions from other parties in order to be able to invest the president and to run the government. They need 6 more votes to reach the absolute majority. Simple majority is guaranteed with the current 62 representatives as long as they were 12 abstentions or absence, reducing to 2 the necessary abstentions/absence for each additional vote obtained.

There are important barriers that hinder the setting of a majority: the nature itself of Junts pel Si, the polarization of election and the necessity to take into account other policy domains (social, fiscal,...) on the top of the "national" issue.

Junts pel Si's method establishes a plebiscitary approach of the election, with a limited length in time and a reduced political action in domains different from the "national" issue. However, differences at the socio-economic level appear even more important when support within the parliament is sought.

Social and economic measures of its program are subject to independence, and the major part of them are in contradiction with the former behaviour of CIU (regarding the VAT on culture, progressive PIT, repeal of the Labour Reform Law, the Law for Neighbourhood Rehabilitation). A serious burden for the credibility of an eventual offer for investiture and regarding negotiation to obtain the majority.

Therefore, CUP denies voting for Artur Mas who have been strongly criticised for his condescension towards corruption and his restrictive social policies. To facilitate its investiture would lead to an inner failure.

Another candidate from Junts pel Si would obtain support or abstention from CUP in an easier manner. However, President Mas and CDC do not understand another option than Mas itself, whose leadership has been the focus of the strategy for years. But to obtain the support of CUP could mean that Junts pel Si would have to accept unacceptable standpoints for a very important sector of CDC and its bases of support, with an evident breakup risk. The substitution of Mas could reduce those costs.

Junts pel Si could put its independent approach on hold for a short term in order to set a more representative majority and strength with other(s) force(s) that are willing to change the current situation (CSQP and perhaps PSC?) with the goal to reach a better fitting regarding funding, competences and identity, that are central matters of dissatisfaction. This route would require that a new open approach for this new fitting arose from the general elections set for December 20th. But this would mean breakup risks in Junts pel Si.

Junts pel Si will have to modify its plan in order to tackle a different process longer to the one designed with 18 months of transition but also will need the ability to run the government over other aspects than the “national”.
With which majority?

Agreement? New elections? We will continue...